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Causal Explanation and Revealed Preferences.

This article tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation employing behavioral preferences. When behavioral pre...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 91; no. 2; pp. 269 - 288
Autor principal: Vredenburgh, Kate
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Apr2024
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Causal Explanation and Revealed Preferences.
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        au: Vredenburgh, Kate
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method, the London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
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      ab: This article tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation employing behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2) and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.
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    language: English
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