Can Confirmation Bias Improve Group Learning?
Confirmation bias has been widely studied for its role in failures of reasoning. Individuals exhibiting confirmation bias fail to engage with information that contradicts their current beliefs, and, as a result, can fail to abandon inaccurate beliefs. But although most investigations of confirmation...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 91; no. 2; pp. 329 - 351 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=176098733&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 176098733 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2024 vid: 91 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 176098733 10.1017/psa.2023.176 ppf: 329 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 595KB tig: atl: Can Confirmation Bias Improve Group Learning? aug: au: Gabriel, Nathan O'Connor, Cailin affil: University of California Irvine su: Confirmation bias Social structure Learning sug: subj: Confirmation bias Social structure Learning ab: Confirmation bias has been widely studied for its role in failures of reasoning. Individuals exhibiting confirmation bias fail to engage with information that contradicts their current beliefs, and, as a result, can fail to abandon inaccurate beliefs. But although most investigations of confirmation bias focus on individual learning, human knowledge is typically developed within a social structure. We use network models to show that moderate confirmation bias often improves group learning. However, a downside is that a stronger form of confirmation bias can hurt the knowledge-producing capacity of the community. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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