Existential Risk, Astronomical Waste, and the Reasonableness of a Pure Time Preference for Well-Being.
In this paper, we argue that our moral concern for future well-being should reduce over time due to important practical considerations about how humans interact with spacetime. After surveying several of these considerations (around equality, special duties, existential contingency, and overlapping...
| Publicado en: | Monist Vol. 107; no. 2; pp. 157 - 176 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=176218904&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 176218904 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00269662 MST jtl: Monist issn: 00269662 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2024 vid: 107 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 176218904 10.1093/monist/onae005 ppf: 157 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Existential Risk, Astronomical Waste, and the Reasonableness of a Pure Time Preference for Well-Being. aug: au: Beard, S J Kaczmarek, Patrick affil: University of Cambridge , UK su: Well-being Burden of care Spacetime Gift giving Duty sug: subj: Well-being Burden of care Spacetime Gift giving Duty ab: In this paper, we argue that our moral concern for future well-being should reduce over time due to important practical considerations about how humans interact with spacetime. After surveying several of these considerations (around equality, special duties, existential contingency, and overlapping moral concern) we develop a set of core principles that can both explain their moral significance and highlight why this is inherently bound up with our relationship with spacetime. These relate to the equitable distribution of (1) moral concern in a universe that we can only causally affect in one temporal direction; (2) access to the benefits from using spacetime as a resource; and (3) the burdens of care given (1) and (2). We conclude by considering the practical implications of our argument and find that, while it is often assumed that a preference for present over future well-being weakens the case for existential risk mitigation, this likely is not the case. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Hegeler Institute. item: Monist holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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