The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment.: Or, Should We Confer Any Weight to Crucial Objections the Truth-Value of Which We are Ignorant?
It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some ci...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 1327 - 1349 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=176583012&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 176583012 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2024 vid: 89 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 176583012 10.1007/s10670-022-00585-z ppf: 1327 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 820KB tig: atl: The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment.: Or, Should We Confer Any Weight to Crucial Objections the Truth-Value of Which We are Ignorant? aug: au: Filomeno, Aldo affil: https://ror.org/02cafbr77 Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Viña del Mar, Chile su: Judgment (Psychology) Skepticism History of science Evidentialism Philosophy of history sug: subj: Judgment (Psychology) Skepticism History of science Evidentialism Philosophy of history ab: It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment "propagates" from the crucial objection to the hypothesis. In this paper I study under which conditions this phenomenon occurs, and discuss its significance for the topics of skepticism, scientific realism, and peer disagreement. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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