Hybrid Modal Realism Debugged.
In this paper, I support a hybrid view regarding the metaphysics of worlds. I endorse Lewisian Modal Realism for possible worlds (LMR). My aim is to come up with a hybrid account of impossible worlds that provides all the plenitude of impossibilities for all fine-grained intentional contents. I rais...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 1481 - 1506 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=176583019&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 176583019 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2024 vid: 89 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 176583019 10.1007/s10670-022-00592-0 ppf: 1481 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Hybrid Modal Realism Debugged. aug: au: Fouché, Camille affil: https://ror.org/02wn5qz54 Arché Research Center, Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland https://ror.org/02en5vm52 Sciences, Normes, Démocratie (SND), Sorbonne Université, Paris, France su: Debugging Realism Raw materials sug: subj: Debugging Realism Raw materials ab: In this paper, I support a hybrid view regarding the metaphysics of worlds. I endorse Lewisian Modal Realism for possible worlds (LMR). My aim is to come up with a hybrid account of impossible worlds that provides all the plenitude of impossibilities for all fine-grained intentional contents. I raise several challenges for such a plenitudinous hybrid theory. My version of hybrid modal realism builds impossible worlds as set-theoretic constructions out of genuine individuals and sets of them, that is, as set-theoretic constructions from parts and sets of parts of genuine Lewisian worlds. Structured worlds are defined as sets of tuples: structured entities built out of Lewisian 'raw material'. These structured worlds are ersatz worlds, some of which are impossible. I claim that propositions must be sets of worlds rather than members of sets. Once the construction is in place, I evaluate the proposal and show that my hybrid account is able to supply a plenitude of impossibilities and thus giving the resources to make all the hyperintensional distinctions we are looking for, whilst remaining Lewisian-conservative. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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