Morality, Modality, and Humans with Deep Cognitive Impairments.
Philosophers struggle to explain why human beings with deep cognitive impairments have a higher moral status than certain non-human animals. Modal personism promises to solve this problem. It claims that humans who lack the capacities of "personhood" and the potential to develop them nonetheless cou...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 74; no. 2; pp. 546 - 569 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=176847406&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 176847406 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2024 vid: 74 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 176847406 10.1093/pq/pqad081 ppf: 546 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 501KB tig: atl: Morality, Modality, and Humans with Deep Cognitive Impairments. aug: au: Gildea, William affil: University of Warwick , UK su: Cognition disorders Philosophers Personality (Theory of knowledge) Intellectual disabilities Philosophical analysis sug: subj: Cognition disorders Philosophers Personality (Theory of knowledge) Intellectual disabilities Philosophical analysis keyword: animals cognitive impairment intellectual disability modal personism moral status personhood ab: Philosophers struggle to explain why human beings with deep cognitive impairments have a higher moral status than certain non-human animals. Modal personism promises to solve this problem. It claims that humans who lack the capacities of "personhood" and the potential to develop them nonetheless could have been persons. I argue that modal personism has poor prospects because it's hard to see how we could offer a plausible account of modal personhood. I search for an adequate understanding of modal personhood by considering existing accounts and sketching new ones. But each account fails, either because it objectionably excludes some deeply cognitively impaired humans from the class of modal persons or because it makes modal personhood doubtfully relevant to moral status. And the modal personist cannot solve this problem by appealing to the misfortune suffered by modal persons. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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