Formal Issues of Trope-Only Theories of Universals.
The paper discusses some formal difficulties concerning the theory of universals of Trope-Only ontologies, from which the formal theory of predication advanced by Trope-Only theorists seems to be irremediably affected. It is impossible to lay out a successful defense of a Trope-Only theory without R...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 3; pp. 919 - 947 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=176994853&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 176994853 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2024 vid: 89 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 176994853 10.1007/s10670-022-00563-5 ppf: 919 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1007KB tig: atl: Formal Issues of Trope-Only Theories of Universals. aug: au: Ferrari, Francesco Maria affil: https://ror.org/04wffgt70 Center for Logic, Epistemology and History of Science (CLE), State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Rua Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, 251, Barão Geraldo CEP, 13083-859, Campinas, SP, Brazil su: Nominalism Attitude (Psychology) Theorists sug: subj: Nominalism Attitude (Psychology) Theorists ab: The paper discusses some formal difficulties concerning the theory of universals of Trope-Only ontologies, from which the formal theory of predication advanced by Trope-Only theorists seems to be irremediably affected. It is impossible to lay out a successful defense of a Trope-Only theory without Russellian types, but such types are ontologically inconsistent with tropes' nominalism. Historically, Tropists' first way to avoid the problem is appealing to the supervenience claim, which however fails on its terms and, thus, fails as a ground for a solution to the higher-order or 'type' problem. A later solution involves the invariance of primitive equivalence relations in order to make universals ontologically innocuous. However, I argue that this latter solution fails to meet the requirements imposed on an ontologically unbiased nominalist attitude. So, this paper discusses how Trope-Only theories alter standard formal moves in Nominalism, and also is interested in clarifying further the formal assumptions for these problems. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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