Colors, Perceptual Variation, and Science.
Arguments from perceptual variation challenge the view that colors are objective properties of objects, properties that objects have independent of how they are perceived. This paper attempts, first, to diagnose one central reason why arguments from perceptual variation seem especially challenging f...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 3; pp. 1157 - 1182 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Mar2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=176994864&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 176994864 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2024 vid: 89 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 176994864 10.1007/s10670-022-00574-2 ppf: 1157 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Colors, Perceptual Variation, and Science. aug: au: Watkins, Michael Shech, Elay affil: https://ror.org/02v80fc35 Auburn University, Auburn, USA su: Oxford University Press Objectivism (Philosophy) Color Argument sug: subj: Oxford University Press Objectivism (Philosophy) Color Argument ab: Arguments from perceptual variation challenge the view that colors are objective properties of objects, properties that objects have independent of how they are perceived. This paper attempts, first, to diagnose one central reason why arguments from perceptual variation seem especially challenging for objectivists about color. Second, we offer a response to this challenge, claiming that once we focus on determinate colors rather than the determinables they determine, a response to arguments from perceptual variation becomes apparent. Third, our nominal opponents are relationalist (like Cohen in The red and the real: an essay on color ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) and we will argue that the main argument for rejecting objectivism commits the relationalist to a position that is more radical than the one he would wish to endorse. Fourth, we suggest that insight into which properties could be relational may be found by looking to our best scientific theories. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|