How Simplicity Can be a Virtue in Philosophical Theory-Choice.
Sober and Huemer have independently argued that simplicity has no place in evaluating philosophical views. In particular, they have argued that the best rationales for scientists to appeal to simplicity in judging between rival theories fail to carry over to philosophers judging between rival philos...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 3; pp. 1217 - 1235 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Sober and Huemer have independently argued that simplicity has no place in evaluating philosophical views. In particular, they have argued that the best rationales for scientists to appeal to simplicity in judging between rival theories fail to carry over to philosophers judging between rival philosophical accounts. This paper disagrees with Sober and Huemer. It argues that two rationales for scientific appeals to simplicity equally well underwrite appeals to simplicity when philosophers evaluate rival rational reconstructions of some social normative practice. These two rationales are shown to apply to two philosophical appeals to simplicity: in Quine's argument against analyticity and in an argument against pluralism in accounts of scientific explanation. Some factors are identified that influence how much weight simplicity should carry in these and other philosophical cases. Simplicity's legitimate role in evaluating rival rational reconstructions suggests that simplicity will also turn out to be justly relevant to ontological investigations. |
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