Evidence and Cognition.
Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting claims in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one's explanation of why thi...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 5; pp. 1927 - 1949 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jun2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting claims in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one's explanation of why this first kind of disagreement obtains will cohere with one's theory of evidence. We argue that the best explanation for why cognitive theorists disagree in this way is because their evidence is what they rationally grant. Finally, we explain why our view does not lead to a pernicious kind of relativism in cognitive science. |
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