The Roots of the Paradox of Predictability: A Reply to Gijsbers.

The paradox of predictability refers to situations in which, even in a deterministic universe, a correct prediction of a future action is seemingly impossible because the agent whose action is predicted is determined to act counterpredictively. In a recent contribution to this journal, Victor Gijsbe...

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Published in:Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 5; pp. 2097 - 2105
Main Author: Rummens, Stefan
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Jun2024
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Roots of the Paradox of Predictability: A Reply to Gijsbers.
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        au: Rummens, Stefan
        affil: https://ror.org/05f950310 Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Kard. Mercierplein 2, 3000, Louvain, Belgium
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        Social interaction
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      ab: The paradox of predictability refers to situations in which, even in a deterministic universe, a correct prediction of a future action is seemingly impossible because the agent whose action is predicted is determined to act counterpredictively. In a recent contribution to this journal, Victor Gijsbers provides an example of the paradox in which the undecidability of the situation plays an essential role and claims, additionally, that this undecidability is at the root of all examples of the paradox. This paper argues, first, that the latter claim is not correct because there are clear examples of the paradox in which the situation remains fully decidable. The paper argues, secondly, that, because of its reliance on rather artificial conditions and in contrast with examples referring to the physical nature of the predictor, the example presented by Gijsbers, though technically correct, has little relevance for our understanding of the role of (counter-)predictability in the context of human interactions.
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