Admiration, Affectivity, and Value: Critical Remarks on Exemplarity.
This article delves into the concept of admiration and its role in identifying moral exemplars. It explores different perspectives on admiration from philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, Smith, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. The article argues that the affective and collective nature of admiration...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 58; no. 2; pp. 197 - 215 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This article delves into the concept of admiration and its role in identifying moral exemplars. It explores different perspectives on admiration from philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, Smith, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. The article argues that the affective and collective nature of admiration challenges its reliability as a means of identifying moral excellence. It also highlights the limitations of admiration, including its tendency to focus on the mediocre or base rather than the virtuous. The author suggests that further research is needed to understand the affective nature of admiration and its implications for moral exemplarity. |
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