Virtue, Authenticity and Irony: Themes from Sartre and Williams.
In the course of criticizing indirect forms of consequentialism Bernard Williams argued that because virtues of character enter into the very content of the self, they cannot be instrumentalised. They must, instead, be viewed as cognitive responses to intrinsic value. This paper investigates this ar...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 403 - 413 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
May2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=177220760&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 177220760 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2024 vid: 43 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 177220760 10.1007/s11245-023-09985-4 ppf: 403 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 618KB tig: atl: Virtue, Authenticity and Irony: Themes from Sartre and Williams. aug: au: Thomas, Alan affil: https://ror.org/04m01e293 Department of Philosophy, University of York, Sally Baldwin Building, YO10 5DD, York, UK su: Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980 Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 Virtue Irony Consequentialism (Ethics) Virtues Ethics Virtue ethics sug: subj: Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980 Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 Virtue Irony Consequentialism (Ethics) Virtues Ethics Virtue ethics keyword: Bernard Williams Character Consciousness First person Jean-Paul Sartre Moral philosophy ab: In the course of criticizing indirect forms of consequentialism Bernard Williams argued that because virtues of character enter into the very content of the self, they cannot be instrumentalised. They must, instead, be viewed as cognitive responses to intrinsic value. This paper investigates this argument and relates it to similar claims in the work of Sartre. The inalienability of the first personal point of view represents a common theme and informs a further argument that an agent can only think of him or herself as merely one amongst others via a distinctive ethical use of the trope of irony. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|