Integrity as Incentive-Insensitivity: Moral Incapacity Means One can't be Bought.
This paper develops Bernard Williams's claim that moral incapacity – i.e., one's inability to consider an action as one that could be performed intentionally – 'is proof against reward'. It argues that we should re-construe the notion of moral incapacity in terms of self-identification with a projec...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 503 - 514 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=177220764&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 177220764 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2024 vid: 43 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 177220764 10.1007/s11245-023-09993-4 ppf: 503 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 633KB tig: atl: Integrity as Incentive-Insensitivity: Moral Incapacity Means One can't be Bought. aug: au: Steinberg, Etye affil: https://ror.org/03qxff017 Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, 9190501, Jerusalem, Israel su: Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 Integrity Identity (Psychology) Attitude (Psychology) sug: subj: Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 Integrity Identity (Psychology) Attitude (Psychology) keyword: Moral incapacity Self-Identification State-given reasons ab: This paper develops Bernard Williams's claim that moral incapacity – i.e., one's inability to consider an action as one that could be performed intentionally – 'is proof against reward'. It argues that we should re-construe the notion of moral incapacity in terms of self-identification with a project, commitment, value, etc. in a way that renders this project constitutive of one's self-identity. This consists in one's being insensitive to incentives to reconsider or get oneself to change one's identification with this project. More precisely, self-identification with a project implies that no state-given reason can justify for oneself reconsidering, or getting oneself to revise, or abandon one's identification with that project. This view ties together integrity and self-identification, and avoids problems common to competing views: it avoids regress problems faced by hierarchical theories of identification; it demonstrates that integrationist views of identification overlook the fact that a deep, well-integrated attitude may fail to be incentive-insensitive; and it helps explain what's wrong with 'perverse' cases, where one values acting in a way that one does not all things consider value. It also improves on Williams's own view, by construing moral incapacity not merely in terms of one's incapacity to perform an action (that undermines one's project and thus violates one's integrity), but also in terms of one's incapacity to reconsider one's commitment (to said project). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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