How slurs enact norms, and how to retract them.

The present paper considers controversial utterances that were erroneously taken as derogatory. These examples are puzzling because, despite the audiences’ error, many speakers retract and even apologise for what they didn’t say and didn’t do. In recent years, intuitions about retractions have been...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 203; no. 5; pp. 1 - 22
Autor principal: Marques, Teresa
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2024
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: How slurs enact norms, and how to retract them.
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        au: Marques, Teresa
        affil: https://ror.org/021018s57 Philosophy Department, University of Barcelona, LOGOS Research Group in Analytic Philosophy, BIAP–Barcelona Institute of Analytic Philosophy, C/Montalegre, 6–8, 08001, Barcelona, Spain
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        Apology
        Derogation
        Expressives
        Retraction
        Slurs
      ab: The present paper considers controversial utterances that were erroneously taken as derogatory. These examples are puzzling because, despite the audiences’ error, many speakers retract and even apologise for what they didn’t say and didn’t do. In recent years, intuitions about retractions have been used to test semantic theories. The cases discussed here test the predictive power of theories of derogatory language and help us to better understand what is required to retract a slur. The paper seeks to answer three questions: are the cases considered genuine retractions? If the speakers didn’t derogate by using a slur, how are the cases retractions of derogatory acts? Do these examples support expressive accounts of slurs? I argue that the examples provide evidence for an expressivist account of slurs: a slurring utterance (defeasibly) makes a derogatory speech act where the speaker expresses a commitment to a morally questionable appraisal state, such as disgust or contempt for a target group. A retraction of a derogatory speech act requires undoing the enactment of that commitment, which can be achieved with a genuine apology. This helps explain the conduct of audiences who misunderstand what the speaker says, and the speakers’ reactions.
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