Common Ground in Non-face-to-face Communication: In Sensu Diviso or In Sensu Composito.

Traditional definitions of common ground in terms of iterative de re attitudes do not apply to conversations where at least one conversational participant is not acquainted with the other(s). I propose and compare two potential refinements of traditional definitions based on Abelard's distinction be...

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Publicado en:Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 53; no. 3; pp. 657 - 679
Autor principal: Semeijn, Merel
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2024
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Definitions
        Attitude (Psychology)
        Face-to-face communication
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          Definitions
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        Acquaintance
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      ab: Traditional definitions of common ground in terms of iterative de re attitudes do not apply to conversations where at least one conversational participant is not acquainted with the other(s). I propose and compare two potential refinements of traditional definitions based on Abelard's distinction between generality in sensu composito and in sensu diviso.
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