Friends with the Good: Moral Relativism and Moral Progress.
The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it would make it irrational to classify past changes in public opinion as instances of moral progress, for they would constitute an improvement only from our current point of view. The argument is this. For our assessment o...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 74; no. 3; pp. 886 - 900 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=177680993&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 177680993 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 74 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 177680993 10.1093/pq/pqad101 ppf: 886 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 348KB tig: atl: Friends with the Good: Moral Relativism and Moral Progress. aug: au: Pérez-Navarro, Eduardo affil: University of Santiago de Compostela , Spain su: Moral relativism Objectivism (Philosophy) Public opinion Friendship Social context sug: subj: Moral relativism Objectivism (Philosophy) Public opinion Friendship Social context keyword: assessment-sensitivity moral contextualism moral objectivism moral progress moral relativism ab: The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it would make it irrational to classify past changes in public opinion as instances of moral progress, for they would constitute an improvement only from our current point of view. The argument is this. For our assessment of a change in public opinion as an instance of moral progress to be rational, we need to take the moral claims made before the change to be false simpliciter while being open to the possibility that we ourselves change our minds at some point. These two things can be made compatible if we construe moral relativism as taking the truth of moral claims to be relative to the context of assessment. Thus understood, moral relativism is in fact the only view that makes room for talk of moral progress, as the rest of candidate positions make it irrational. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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