Common Knowledge and Hinge Epistemology.

Common knowledge is ubiquitous in our lives and yet there remains considerable uncertainty about how to model or understand it. Standard analyses of common knowledge end up being challenged by either regress or circularity which then give rise to well-known paradoxes of practical reasoning, such as...

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Publicado en:International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 32; no. 1; pp. 169 - 191
Autor principal: Wilby, Michael
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Feb2024
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Common Knowledge and Hinge Epistemology.
      aug:
        au: Wilby, Michael
        affil: School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Anglia Ruksin University, Cambridge, UK
      su:
        Theory of knowledge
        Practical reason
        Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
        Intentionality (Philosophy)
        Hinges
      sug:
        subj:
          Theory of knowledge
          Practical reason
          Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
          Intentionality (Philosophy)
          Hinges
      keyword:
        Collective Intentionality
        Common Knowledge
        Hinge Epistemology
        Ludwig Wittgenstein
        The Generals' Paradox
      ab: Common knowledge is ubiquitous in our lives and yet there remains considerable uncertainty about how to model or understand it. Standard analyses of common knowledge end up being challenged by either regress or circularity which then give rise to well-known paradoxes of practical reasoning, such as the Two Generals' Paradox. This paper argues that the nature and utility of common knowledge can be illuminated by appeal to Wittgenstein's Hinge Epistemology. It is argued that those things that we standardly think of as being common knowledge in our lives are the same as those that Wittgenstein identified as hinge certainties. This identification of common knowledge with hinge certainties allows us to resolve the regress problem for common knowledge and explain how the Two Generals' Paradox arises.
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    language: English
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