Personal persistence.

According to perdurantist accounts of persistence, transtemporal aggregates of stages, 'worms', are 'the referents of ordinary terms, members of ordinary domains of quantification, subjects of ordinary predications, and so on...on the stage view...it is instantaneous stages rather than worms that pl...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 90; no. 3; pp. 335 - 352
Autor principal: Baber, H. E.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=177929575&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 177929575
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00405825
        HL0
      jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy
      issn: 00405825
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2024
      vid: 90
      iid: 3
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        177929575
        10.1111/theo.12535
      ppf: 335
      ppct: 17
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: C
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 279KB
      tig:
        atl: Personal persistence.
      aug:
        au: Baber, H. E.
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of San Diego, San Diego California, , USA
      su:
        Perdurantism & endurantism (Philosophy)
        Plausibility (Logic)
        Survival
        Philosophical analysis
        Indeterminism (Philosophy)
      sug:
        subj:
          Perdurantism & endurantism (Philosophy)
          Plausibility (Logic)
          Survival
          Philosophical analysis
          Indeterminism (Philosophy)
      ab: According to perdurantist accounts of persistence, transtemporal aggregates of stages, 'worms', are 'the referents of ordinary terms, members of ordinary domains of quantification, subjects of ordinary predications, and so on...on the stage view...it is instantaneous stages rather than worms that play this role'. I argue the stage theory should be preferred as an account of personal persistence. I consider the way in which four‐dimensionalist accounts of personal persistence are organized and the conditions which, arguably, any plausible account of personal persistence should satisfy. I sketch a semantics for the stage theory which yields a stage‐theoretical account of personal persistence that satisfies these conditions. I argue that standard purdurantist accounts do not. I conclude that standard purdurantist accounts fail because, while persons view themselves and their worlds from the time‐bound first‐person perspective of stages, purdurantist accounts privilege the atemporal view of persons as four‐dimensional aggregates of stages or 'worms'. Perdurantist accounts produce counterintuitive results in fission cases because there is a discrepancy between a person's time‐bound first‐person perspective and the purdurantist view from nowhen.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2024
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N