Bernard Williams, realistic liberalism, and the politics of "normativity".
Following in the footsteps of Bernard Williams, I aim to delineate and advance a more realistic, less moralistic approach to thinking about morals and politics in a liberal culture. To do so, I push back against one framing of what Williams meant in urging greater realism, and in criticizing what he...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 2; pp. 489 - 507 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=177946802&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 177946802 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2024 vid: 32 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 177946802 10.1111/ejop.12866 ppf: 489 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Bernard Williams, realistic liberalism, and the politics of "normativity". aug: au: Dannenberg, Jorah affil: Stanford University, Stanford California, , USA su: Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 Liberalism Normativity (Ethics) Practical politics Ethics sug: subj: Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 Liberalism Normativity (Ethics) Practical politics Ethics ab: Following in the footsteps of Bernard Williams, I aim to delineate and advance a more realistic, less moralistic approach to thinking about morals and politics in a liberal culture. To do so, I push back against one framing of what Williams meant in urging greater realism, and in criticizing what he saw as political theory's excessive moralism, which has recently gained traction. According to a number of recent authors, the important issue Williams raised should be understood in terms of whether there are two "kinds" or "sources" of "normativity" found in liberal politics and morality, respectively: Realists are said to accuse their Moralist opponents of countenancing only one normativity, which is moral, when in fact there are two, one of which is "distinctively political." I show how this now popular framing leads to a number of distortions, particularly insofar as our aim is to understand Williams' moral and political thought. I go on to argue that, once these are sorted out, the term 'normativity' itself contributes to the problem—current usages of the term are inextricably bound up with a recognizably moralistic style of thought, of the sort that Williams encouraged us to oppose. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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