Basic equality: A Hegelian resolution.
Contemporary political philosophers often take for granted that for political purposes all humans are to be considered of equal worth. The difficulty, as Bernard Williams observed, is to find an interpretation of this claim that does not collapse into absurdity or triviality. I show that the princip...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 2; pp. 507 - 532 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=177946804&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 177946804 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2024 vid: 32 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 177946804 10.1111/ejop.12878 ppf: 507 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2.2MB tig: atl: Basic equality: A Hegelian resolution. aug: au: Thakkar, Jonny affil: Swarthmore College, Swarthmore Pennsylvania, , USA su: Political philosophy Equality Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 Absurd (Philosophy) Justification (Ethics) sug: subj: Political philosophy Equality Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 Absurd (Philosophy) Justification (Ethics) ab: Contemporary political philosophers often take for granted that for political purposes all humans are to be considered of equal worth. The difficulty, as Bernard Williams observed, is to find an interpretation of this claim that does not collapse into absurdity or triviality. I show that the principal attempts to solve this problem all beg the question against an Aristotelian proponent of natural hierarchy. I then explore existing proposals for dissolving the problem of basic equality, whether by denying the need for justification altogether or by reframing justification in either ostensive or coherentist fashion, showing that each fails to account for our sense that basic equality is objectively true. In response, I outline a Hegelian approach that treats the commitment to basic equality as a social fact that constrains philosophical reasoning in contemporary liberal democracies. By itself that might suggest complacent conservatism or cultural relativism, but I argue that practices and institutions that reflect and foster a commitment to basic equality have a distinct value in permitting reciprocal recognition and thereby enabling us to make a distinct class of normative claims on one another. This Hegelian resolution of the problem is dialectically superior to its rivals and therefore warrants further development. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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