Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist?

Perception plays a central and wide‐ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of ha...

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Publicado en:European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 2; pp. 321 - 342
Autor principal: Whiting, Daniel
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2024
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Whiting, Daniel
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
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        Cavendish, Margaret
        Realism
        Hallucinations
        Philosophy
        Sympathy
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          Cavendish, Margaret
          Realism
          Hallucinations
          Philosophy
          Sympathy
      ab: Perception plays a central and wide‐ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is consistent with naïve realism. In closing, I address challenges to the interpretation, one of which turns on whether Cavendish allows for action at a distance. I argue that she does.
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