Do Threats or Shaming Increase Public Support for Policy Concessions? Alliance Coercion and Burden-Sharing in NATO.
Existing literature suggests that alliance members can use their partners' abandonment fears to obtain favorable concessions for themselves. However, evidence on the effectiveness of threats of abandonment as motivation for defense burden-sharing remains limited. This article uses a survey experimen...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 68; no. 2; pp. 1 - 16 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Jun2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=177947983&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 177947983 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2024 vid: 68 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 177947983 10.1093/isq/sqae015 ppf: 1 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 177947983 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 177947983 tig: atl: Do Threats or Shaming Increase Public Support for Policy Concessions? Alliance Coercion and Burden-Sharing in NATO. aug: au: Blankenship, Brian affil: University of Miami , USA su: Poland North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public support Public shaming Government policy Public utilities Military spending Therapeutic alliance sug: subj: Public support Public shaming Government policy Public utilities Poland North Atlantic Treaty Organization Regulation and Administration of Communications, Electric, Gas, and Other Utilities Military spending Therapeutic alliance ab: Existing literature suggests that alliance members can use their partners' abandonment fears to obtain favorable concessions for themselves. However, evidence on the effectiveness of threats of abandonment as motivation for defense burden-sharing remains limited. This article uses a survey experiment conducted in Poland and Germany to assess how American signals of support and threats of abandonment shape public support for increasing their countries' military spending. The findings suggest that threats of abandonment increase public support for higher defense spending, whereas approaches like "naming and shaming" under-contributing partners do not. However, assurances of protection did not decrease support for defense spending, and combining threats with assurances if anything increased those threats' effects. Threats are thus most effective when they do not fundamentally undermine targets' confidence in US protection. The findings have implications for understanding alliance politics and the utility of public pressure, and for policy debates about encouraging defense burden-sharing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|