Price customization and targeting in matching markets.
We introduce a model of (platform‐mediated) many‐to‐many matching in which agents' preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. We first show how the model can be used to derive the profit‐maximizing matching plans under customized pricing. We then investigate the implications fo...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 2; pp. 230 - 266 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=177961827&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 177961827 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2024 vid: 55 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 177961827 10.1111/1756-2171.12464 ppf: 230 ppct: 36 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 662KB tig: atl: Price customization and targeting in matching markets. aug: au: Gomes, Renato Pavan, Alessandro affil: Central Bank of Brazil and Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France Northwestern University and CEPR su: Prices Electronic commerce Target marketing Customization Price discrimination sug: subj: Prices Electronic commerce Target marketing Electronic shopping and mail-order houses Electronic Shopping Customization Price discrimination keyword: asymmetric information many‐to‐many matching platforms second‐ and third‐degree price discrimination targeting uniform pricing asymmetric information many‐to‐many matching platforms second‐ and third‐degree price discrimination targeting uniform pricing ab: We introduce a model of (platform‐mediated) many‐to‐many matching in which agents' preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. We first show how the model can be used to derive the profit‐maximizing matching plans under customized pricing. We then investigate the implications for targeting and welfare of uniform pricing (be it explicitly mandated or induced by privacy regulation), preventing the platform from conditioning prices on agents' profiles. The model can be applied to study ad exchanges, online retailing, and media markets. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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