An Ontology of Life and the Myth of the Technological Singularity.

The "singularity"--a future moment when artificial intelligence becomes equal to or surpasses human intelligence making them indistinguishable--can be challenged by philosophy. I present an ontology of life, the subject of bona fide intelligence, to interrogate what underlies human intelligence. I a...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Dialogue (00122246) Vol. 66; no. 2/3; pp. 109 - 116
Autor principal: Zhang, Grace
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Phi Sigma Tau Apr2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:The "singularity"--a future moment when artificial intelligence becomes equal to or surpasses human intelligence making them indistinguishable--can be challenged by philosophy. I present an ontology of life, the subject of bona fide intelligence, to interrogate what underlies human intelligence. I argue: 1) internal purposiveness is intrinsic to life, and 2) living beings are the only things not solely explicable by mechanical and chemical laws. I engage Hubert Dreyfus' critique of artificial reason, What Computers Still Can't Do, though his three criteria for human intelligence fall short due to his separating physical and phenomenological explanatory "worlds" arising in absence of an ontology of life. A further question concerns what instantiates human intelligence, which I later introduce as a promising point of departure.