From representationalism to identity representationalism.
Representationalism about consciousness is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on the content of that experience. Much of the literature on representationalism concerns putative objections and replies, rather than clarifying the details of the view itself. Defenders of...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 6/7; pp. 1565 - 1588 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=178209403&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 178209403 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 181 iid: 6/7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 178209403 10.1007/s11098-024-02163-1 ppf: 1565 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 664KB tig: atl: From representationalism to identity representationalism. aug: au: Quinn, Connor affil: https://ror.org/00hj54h04 The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA su: Representation (Philosophy) Consciousness Phenomenology Metaphysics Philosophy sug: subj: Representation (Philosophy) Consciousness Phenomenology Metaphysics Philosophy keyword: Content Experience Perception Representationalism ab: Representationalism about consciousness is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on the content of that experience. Much of the literature on representationalism concerns putative objections and replies, rather than clarifying the details of the view itself. Defenders of representationalism face a question which has thus far been largely overlooked: what, precisely, is the relationship between phenomenal character and content? The representationalist has three options: mere supervenience, building or metaphysical dependence, or identity. After examining a number of versions of the first two views, I conclude that they all face serious metaphysical difficulties. I argue instead that this relationship is identity, despite the fact that identifying content and phenomenal character requires revising our view of the content of experiences. Identifying content and phenomenal character strengthens the dialectical position of representationalists by providing them with better responses to anti-representationalist objections. In closing, I show how we can accept the implications of this revisionary view of perceptual content. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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