A Modal Condition for the Beginning of the Universe.
This paper considers two problems—one in philosophy of religion and another in philosophy of physics—and shows that the two problems have one solution. Some Christian philosophers have endorsed the views that (i) there was a first finitely long period of time, (ii) God is in time, and yet (iii) God...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 6; pp. 2343 - 2376 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=178230855&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 178230855 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2024 vid: 89 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 178230855 10.1007/s10670-022-00632-9 ppf: 2343 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 567KB tig: atl: A Modal Condition for the Beginning of the Universe. aug: au: Linford, Daniel affil: Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, 1301 Lincoln Mall Apt 806, 68508, Lincoln, NE, USA su: Quantum gravity Quantum theory Spacetime Philosophers sug: subj: Quantum gravity Quantum theory Spacetime Philosophers ab: This paper considers two problems—one in philosophy of religion and another in philosophy of physics—and shows that the two problems have one solution. Some Christian philosophers have endorsed the views that (i) there was a first finitely long period of time, (ii) God is in time, and yet (iii) God did not have a beginning. If there was a first finitely long period of time and God is in time then there was a first finitely long period of time in God's life. But if God's life includes a first finitely long period of time, then, on one initially intuitive conception of beginning to exist, God began to exist. Thus, at first glance, (i)–(iii) are not mutually compatible. Meanwhile, on a variety of proposals for quantum gravity theories or interpretations of quantum theory, space-time is not fundamental to physical reality and instead can (somehow) be explained in terms of yet more fundamental physical substructures. As I show, there is a strong intuition that if space-time is not fundamental to physical reality, then, even if there were a first finitely long period in the life of physical reality, physical reality would be beginningless. Thus, both theistic philosophers and philosophers of physics have developed theories on which some beginningless entities have a first finitely long temporal period in their lives and so both groups should be interested in developing criteria that distinguish such entities from entities with a beginning. In this paper, I offer one necessary (but not sufficient) condition, namely, that entities that begin to exist are absent from the closest possible worlds without time. The view that I defend has one significant upshot: no sound argument can use the mere fact (if it is a fact) that past time is finite to reach the conclusion that the totality of physical reality had a beginning. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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