“The value-free ideal, the autonomy thesis, and cognitive diversity”.
Some debates about the role of non-epistemic values in science discuss the so-called Value-Free Ideal together with the autonomy thesis, to the point that they may be assumed to be intertwined. As I will argue in this article, the two are independent from one another, are supported by different argu...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 204; no. 1; pp. 1 - 22 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=178260509&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 178260509 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 204 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 178260509 10.1007/s11229-024-04673-1 ppf: 1 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 962KB tig: atl: “The value-free ideal, the autonomy thesis, and cognitive diversity”. aug: au: Politi, Vincenzo affil: https://ror.org/052g8jq94 Institut d’Història de La Ciència (iHC), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain sug: keyword: Autonomy Cognitive labor Democratisation of science Political philosophy of science Social epistemology Value-free ideal ab: Some debates about the role of non-epistemic values in science discuss the so-called Value-Free Ideal together with the autonomy thesis, to the point that they may be assumed to be intertwined. As I will argue in this article, the two are independent from one another, are supported by different arguments, and ought to be disentangled. I will also show that the arguments against value-freedom and supporting a value-laden conception of science, are different from the arguments against autonomy, which support democratized science. Moreover, while some of the arguments against autonomy and for democratized science may actually be consistent with value-freedom, they conflict with some philosophical views about the internal diversity of well-designed epistemic communities. This article distinguishes the Value-Free Ideal and the autonomy thesis, as well as their antitheses, and investigates their relations to some of the socio-epistemological models of the social organization of scientific research. Its aim is to make explicit some incompatibilities between different normative frameworks developed in philosophy of science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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