In defense of humean non-universal laws.
In this paper, I raise a novel objection to David Lewis’s Humean account of laws. The objection is that non-universal laws are metaphysically possible, but Lewis’s account cannot accommodate them. I then propose and defend an extension of Lewis’s view that gives us an account of Humean non-universal...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 204; no. 1; pp. 1 - 29 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In this paper, I raise a novel objection to David Lewis’s Humean account of laws. The objection is that non-universal laws are metaphysically possible, but Lewis’s account cannot accommodate them. I then propose and defend an extension of Lewis’s view that gives us an account of Humean non-universal laws. |
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