The metaphysics of mechanisms: an ontic structural realist perspective.
Existing metaphysical accounts of mechanisms commit to the existence of objects or entities posited in scientific theories, and thus fall within the category of maximal metaphysics. In this paper, I demonstrate the incompatibility of object-based metaphysics of mechanisms with the prevailing trend i...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 204; no. 1; pp. 1 - 23 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=178346880&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 178346880 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 204 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 178346880 10.1007/s11229-024-04684-y ppf: 1 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: The metaphysics of mechanisms: an ontic structural realist perspective. aug: au: Jiang, Yihan affil: https://ror.org/024mrxd33 School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK sug: keyword: Mechanism Minimal metaphysics Ontic structural realism Philosophy of biology ab: Existing metaphysical accounts of mechanisms commit to the existence of objects or entities posited in scientific theories, and thus fall within the category of maximal metaphysics. In this paper, I demonstrate the incompatibility of object-based metaphysics of mechanisms with the prevailing trend in the philosophy of physics by discussing the so-called bottoming-out problem. In response, I propose and flesh out a structuralist metaphysics of mechanisms based on Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), which is a kind of minimal metaphysics. I argue that the metaphysical underpinnings of mechanisms are structures, whose metaphysical nature is elaborated through comparison with existing metaphysical theories of mechanisms. After that, I address the concern of whether objects in mechanisms can be accommodated in my account by invoking existing metaphysical theories of objects in special science by structuralists, such as Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press.)’s real pattern account, and suggesting a potential alignment between OSR and processual ontology. Finally, I demonstrate how my view can naturally serve as the metaphysics for Mechanism 2.0 and be applied to systems biology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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