Why It Is Not Unreasonable to Fear Terrorism.
A common view has it that since we are far likelier to be killed in some road or household accident than in a terror attack, our fear of the latter is exaggerated. I argue that terrorism's relatively limited death toll need not mean that fearing it is unreasonable, nor does it immediately imply that...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 41; no. 3; pp. 409 - 423 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=178441407&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 178441407 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 41 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 178441407 10.1111/japp.12689 ppf: 409 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 220KB tig: atl: Why It Is Not Unreasonable to Fear Terrorism. aug: au: Fish, Eran affil: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany su: Terrorism Counterterrorism Death rate Roadkill Traffic accidents Legal evidence Suicide bombings sug: subj: Terrorism Counterterrorism Death rate Roadkill Traffic accidents Legal evidence Suicide bombings ab: A common view has it that since we are far likelier to be killed in some road or household accident than in a terror attack, our fear of the latter is exaggerated. I argue that terrorism's relatively limited death toll need not mean that fearing it is unreasonable, nor does it immediately imply that counter‐terrorism policies are unjustified – whatever other, legitimate concerns these policies give rise to. First, I argue that in the special case of terrorism, it is misleading to focus on risk per capita, as critics typically do. Second, while terrorism has a probabilistic component which should be relevant to decision‐making, risk is not entirely or even primarily what terrorism is all about. Third, I argue that fearing terrorism may be reasonable even while recognizing the small probability of personal harm. Due to terrorism's random character, the belief that one will escape harm rests on little more than statistical evidence. As I explain, this leaves some room for reasonable doubt, and a justified level of fear. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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