Will intelligent machines become moral patients?
This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 109; no. 1; pp. 95 - 117 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=178716131&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 178716131 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 109 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 178716131 10.1111/phpr.13019 ppf: 95 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 441KB tig: atl: Will intelligent machines become moral patients? aug: au: Moosavi, Parisa affil: York University su: Artificial intelligence Conscious automata Machine learning Ethics Antiquities sug: subj: Artificial intelligence Conscious automata Machine learning Ethics Antiquities ab: This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency: having a good of one's own. I then argue that intelligent machines are no different from traditional artifacts in this respect. To make this argument, I examine the feature of AIs that enables them to improve their intelligence, i.e., machine learning. I argue that there is no reason to believe that future advances in machine learning will take AIs closer to having a good of their own. I thus argue that concerns about the moral status of future AIs are unwarranted. Nothing about the nature of intelligent machines makes them a better candidate for acquiring moral patiency than the traditional artifacts whose moral status does not concern us. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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