Attention and cognitive penetration: reflections on Dustin Stokes' Thinking and Perceiving.
Dustin Stokes book Thinking and Perceiving is a substantial achievement. In this comment, I discuss issues related to cognitive penetration. While I agree with Stokes' criticisms of Fodor and Pylyshyn's discussion of cognitive penetration with respect to the role of attention, I provide a supporting...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 8; pp. 1741 - 1748 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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