Egyptology and fanaticism.
Various decision theories share a troubling implication. They imply that, for any finite amount of value, it would be better to wager it all for a vanishingly small probability of some greater value. Counterintuitive as it might be, this fanaticism has seemingly compelling independent arguments in i...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 8; pp. 1903 - 1924 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=178777749&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 178777749 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2024 vid: 181 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 178777749 10.1007/s11098-024-02180-0 ppf: 1903 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 900KB tig: atl: Egyptology and fanaticism. aug: au: Wilkinson, Hayden affil: Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford, Trajan House, Mill Street, OX2 0DJ, Oxford, UK su: Egyptology Fanaticism Ethics Risk aversion Philosophy sug: subj: Egyptology Fanaticism Ethics Risk aversion Philosophy keyword: Egyptology objection Expected value theory Separability Unbounded utility ab: Various decision theories share a troubling implication. They imply that, for any finite amount of value, it would be better to wager it all for a vanishingly small probability of some greater value. Counterintuitive as it might be, this fanaticism has seemingly compelling independent arguments in its favour. In this paper, I consider perhaps the most prima facie compelling such argument: an Egyptology argument (an analogue of the Egyptology argument from population ethics). I show that, despite recent objections from Russell (Noûs, 2023) and Goodsell (Analysis 81(3):420–426, 2021), the argument's premises can be justified and defended, and the argument itself remains compelling. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|