Cognitive Science, Phenomenology, and the Unity of Science: Can Phenomenology Be the Foundation of Science?
Hume once argued the basic science to be not physics but "the science of man" and the foundation of this science to be the empiricist mechanism of association governed by the law of similarity in appearance--now more popular than ever in the form of artificial neural networks. I update Hume's pictur...
| Publicado en: | Studia Phaenomenologica Vol. 24; pp. 81 - 103 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Zeta Books
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179011489&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179011489 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15825647 8XIP jtl: Studia Phaenomenologica issn: 15825647 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2024 vid: 24 pid: 71195 pub: Zeta Books artinfo: ui: 179011489 10.5840/studphaen2024245 ppf: 81 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 5MB tig: atl: Cognitive Science, Phenomenology, and the Unity of Science: Can Phenomenology Be the Foundation of Science? aug: au: Lopes, Jesse affil: Boston College su: Artificial neural networks Scientific language Cognitive science Linguistics Phenomenology sug: subj: Artificial neural networks Scientific language Cognitive science Linguistics Phenomenology keyword: associationism cognitive science language of thought phenomenology unity of science ab: Hume once argued the basic science to be not physics but "the science of man" and the foundation of this science to be the empiricist mechanism of association governed by the law of similarity in appearance--now more popular than ever in the form of artificial neural networks. I update Hume's picture by showing phenomenology to be centrally concerned with providing a unifying basis for all the sciences (including physics) by going beyond the psychology of associationism (passive synthesis) to reveal phenomena that are irreducibly syntactic (not associative) in structure. I therefore argue that the language of thought (LOT) is the necessary mechanism at the basis of these descriptive phenomena. I conclude by sketching a new picture of all the sciences unified by LOT based on Husserl's opposition to Galilean "physicomathematical" science vis-à-vis the life-world (Lebenswelt). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Studia Phaenomenologica is the property of Zeta Books and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Studia Phaenomenologica holder: Zeta Books dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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