Center indifference and skepticism.
Many philosophers have been attracted to a restricted version of the principle of indifference in the case of self‐locating belief. Roughly speaking, this principle states that, within any given possible world, one should be indifferent between different hypotheses concerning who one is within that...
| Published in: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 58; no. 3; pp. 778 - 799 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2024
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179071242&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179071242 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2024 vid: 58 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 179071242 10.1111/nous.12478 ppf: 778 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 254KB tig: atl: Center indifference and skepticism. aug: au: Builes, David affil: Princeton University su: Philosophers Theory of knowledge Realism Hypothesis Criticism Skepticism Apathy sug: subj: Philosophers Theory of knowledge Realism Hypothesis Criticism Skepticism Apathy ab: Many philosophers have been attracted to a restricted version of the principle of indifference in the case of self‐locating belief. Roughly speaking, this principle states that, within any given possible world, one should be indifferent between different hypotheses concerning who one is within that possible world, so long as those hypotheses are compatible with one's evidence. My first goal is to defend a more precise version of this principle. After responding to several existing criticisms of such a principle, I argue that existing formulations of the principle are crucially ambiguous, and I go on to defend a particular disambiguation of the principle. According to the disambiguation I defend, how we should apply this restricted principle of indifference sensitively depends on our background metaphysical beliefs. My second goal is to apply this disambiguated principle to classical skeptical problems in epistemology. In particular, I argue that Eternalism threatens to lead us to external world skepticism, and Modal Realism threatens to lead us to inductive skepticism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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