Making sense of the doxastic approach to thought insertion.
With a higher prevalence in schizophrenia, delusions of thought insertion (TI) are regarded as one of the most severe symptoms of psychosis. Patients suffering from TI report that external agents are able to place thoughts into their minds or skulls. A version of the doxastic approach characterizes...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 204; no. 3; pp. 1 - 25 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179249649&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179249649 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2024 vid: 204 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 179249649 10.1007/s11229-024-04721-w ppf: 1 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Making sense of the doxastic approach to thought insertion. aug: au: López-Silva, Pablo affil: https://ror.org/00h9jrb69 School of Psychology, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile https://ror.org/00h9jrb69 Research Centre in Cognition and Language Development, Universidad de Valparaíso,, Valparaíso, Chile Institute of Complex Systems of Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile https://ror.org/012pnb193 Millennium Institute for Research in Depression and Personality (MIDAP), Valparaíso, Chile https://ror.org/052gg0110 LATAM Network Lead, The Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice in Health and Social Care, St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK sug: keyword: Delusions Doxastic approach Endorsement Explanationism Psychosis Thought insertion ab: With a higher prevalence in schizophrenia, delusions of thought insertion (TI) are regarded as one of the most severe symptoms of psychosis. Patients suffering from TI report that external agents are able to place thoughts into their minds or skulls. A version of the doxastic approach characterizes delusions as abnormal beliefs rooted in anomalous experiences. Nonetheless, the exact role of these experiences in determining the content and the way in which delusional beliefs are fixated is still under debate. While endorsement models claim that the abnormal experience comprises the very content of the delusional beliefs, explanationist approaches claim that delusional beliefs emerge as explanations for abnormal experiences with less specific content. This paper combines conceptual analysis with phenomenological data to examine the merits of both endorsement and explanationist approaches to TI. I propose that potential solutions to the dispute could lay in finding a middle ground between the two approaches, and non-exhaustive ways in which hybrid doxastic approaches to TI could be formulated. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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