Do Better Managers Get Better Loan Contracts?
This paper examines the impact of managerial ability on bank loan contracting. We find that firms with higher‐ability managers obtain more favourable loan contract terms, including lower loan spreads, fewer covenants, and more short‐term maturities. Furthermore, the negative relation between manager...
| Publicado en: | Abacus Vol. 60; no. 3; pp. 539 - 578 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179374585&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179374585 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00013072 AUB jtl: Abacus issn: 00013072 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2024 vid: 60 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 179374585 10.1111/abac.12313 ppf: 539 ppct: 39 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 405KB tig: atl: Do Better Managers Get Better Loan Contracts? aug: au: Francis, Bill B. Ren, Ning Sun, Xian Wu, Qiang affil: Lally School of Management, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110 8th Street, Pittsburgh Building, Troy NY, 12180‐3590 College of Arts and Sciences, University of Redlands, Redlands CA, 92373 Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, 100 International Drive, Baltimore MD, 21201 School of Accounting and Finance, Hong Kong Polytechnic University su: Default (Finance) Loan agreements Bank loans Executive ability (Management) Loans Counterparty risk Agency costs sug: subj: Default (Finance) Loan agreements Bank loans Executive ability (Management) Loans Counterparty risk Agency costs keyword: Agency costs of debt Bank loan contracting Default risk Information opacity Managerial ability ab: This paper examines the impact of managerial ability on bank loan contracting. We find that firms with higher‐ability managers obtain more favourable loan contract terms, including lower loan spreads, fewer covenants, and more short‐term maturities. Furthermore, the negative relation between managerial ability and loan spread is concentrated in firms with higher information asymmetry, higher default risk, or lower agency costs of debt. Finally, we find that firms with higher‐ability managers are more likely to choose public bonds over bank loans. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Abacus is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Abacus holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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