On Cognitive Modeling and Other Minds.
Scientists and philosophers alike debate whether various systems such as plants and bacteria exercise cognition. One strategy for resolving such debates is to ground claims about nonhuman cognition in evidence from mathematical models of cognitive capacities. In this article, I show that proponents...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 91; no. 3; pp. 615 - 634 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179608561&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179608561 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 91 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 179608561 10.1017/psa.2023.168 ppf: 615 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 231KB tig: atl: On Cognitive Modeling and Other Minds. aug: au: Gamboa, J. P. affil: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA su: Cognition Mathematical models Philosophers Data modeling Bacteria sug: subj: Cognition Mathematical models Philosophers Data modeling Bacteria ab: Scientists and philosophers alike debate whether various systems such as plants and bacteria exercise cognition. One strategy for resolving such debates is to ground claims about nonhuman cognition in evidence from mathematical models of cognitive capacities. In this article, I show that proponents of this strategy face two major challenges: demarcating phenomenological models from process models and overcoming underdetermination by model fit. I argue that even if the demarcation problem is resolved, fitting a process model to behavioral data is, on its own, not strong evidence for any cognitive process, let alone processes shared with humans. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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