A dispositional account of technical functions.
It is commonly held that technical artifacts have a “dual nature.” On the one hand, technical artifacts are material objects–they are constituted by their physical components and structures. On the other hand, technical artifacts are intentional objects in virtue of their teleological nature—they ar...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 204; no. 3; pp. 1 - 20 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179626384&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179626384 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2024 vid: 204 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 179626384 10.1007/s11229-024-04756-z ppf: 1 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 281KB tig: atl: A dispositional account of technical functions. aug: au: Roberts, Mitchell affil: https://ror.org/01f5ytq51 Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 77843, College Station, TX, USA sug: keyword: Artifacts Dispositions Metaphysics Technical functions Technology ab: It is commonly held that technical artifacts have a “dual nature.” On the one hand, technical artifacts are material objects–they are constituted by their physical components and structures. On the other hand, technical artifacts are intentional objects in virtue of their teleological nature—they are for some purpose that is contingent on the intentional states of agents. I argue that this view is false when properly understood. To do this, I develop a theory of technical functions that reduces functions to physical dispositions (Dispositional Account of Technical Functions, DAF). First, I argue that the different notions of technical functions are best understood with reference to dispositions. Then, I argue that technical functions, like dispositions, are modal properties that manifest under appropriate circumstances. Further, I argue that the seemingly teleological nature of technical functions can be accounted for with reference to user expectations. Phrases like “proper use,” “malfunctioning,” and “accidental use” are intentional concepts that agents ascribe to relevant dispositions. Hence, an artifact is a physical object with dispositions, and subcategories of technical functions are ultimately socio-cultural facts about what we expect from the use of artifacts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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