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Over What Range Should Reliabilists Measure Reliability?

Process reliabilist accounts claim that a belief is justified when it is the result of a reliable belief-forming process. Yet over what range of possible token processes is this reliability calculated? I argue against the idea that all possible token processes (in the actual world, or some other sub...

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Published in:Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 7; pp. 2641 - 2662
Main Author: Buijsman, Stefan
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Oct2024
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Over What Range Should Reliabilists Measure Reliability?
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        au: Buijsman, Stefan
        affil: https://ror.org/02e2c7k09 TU Delft, Jaffalaan 5, 2628 BX, Delft, The Netherlands
      su: Measurement
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        subj: Measurement
      ab: Process reliabilist accounts claim that a belief is justified when it is the result of a reliable belief-forming process. Yet over what range of possible token processes is this reliability calculated? I argue against the idea that all possible token processes (in the actual world, or some other subset of possible worlds) are to be considered using the case of a user acquiring beliefs based on the output of an AI system, which is typically reliable for a substantial local range but unreliable when all possible inputs are considered. I show that existing solutions to the generality problem imply that these cases cannot be solved by a more fine-grained typing of the belief-forming process. Instead, I suggest that reliability is evaluated over a range restricted by the content of the actual belief and by the similarity of the input to the actual input.
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    language: English
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