The Unity of Robustness: Why Agreement Across Model Reports is Just as Valuable as Agreement Among Experiments.
A number of philosophers of science have argued that there are important differences between robustness in modeling and experimental contexts, and—in particular—many of them have claimed that the former is non-confirmatory. In this paper, I argue for the opposite conclusion: robust hypotheses are co...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 7; pp. 2733 - 2753 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179636411&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179636411 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 89 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 179636411 10.1007/s10670-022-00649-0 ppf: 2733 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 680KB tig: atl: The Unity of Robustness: Why Agreement Across Model Reports is Just as Valuable as Agreement Among Experiments. aug: au: Dethier, Corey affil: https://ror.org/0304hq317 Leibniz Universität Hannover, Hannover, Germany su: Philosophers Concord Argument Hypothesis Design sug: subj: Philosophers Concord Argument Hypothesis Design ab: A number of philosophers of science have argued that there are important differences between robustness in modeling and experimental contexts, and—in particular—many of them have claimed that the former is non-confirmatory. In this paper, I argue for the opposite conclusion: robust hypotheses are confirmed under conditions that do not depend on the differences between and models and experiments—that is, the degree to which the robust hypothesis is confirmed depends on precisely the same factors in both situations. The positive argument turns on the fact that confirmation theory doesn't recognize a difference between different sources of evidence. Most of the paper is devoted to rebutting various objections designed to show that it should. I end by explaining why philosophers of science have (often) gone wrong on this point. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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