Aggregation in an Infinite, Relativistic Universe.
Aggregative moral theories face a series of devastating problems when we apply them in a physically realistic setting. According to current physics, our universe is likely infinitely large, and will contain infinitely many morally valuable events. But standard aggregative theories are ill-equipped t...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 7; pp. 2753 - 2782 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Oct2024
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179636412&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179636412 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 89 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 179636412 10.1007/s10670-022-00650-7 ppf: 2753 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Aggregation in an Infinite, Relativistic Universe. aug: au: Wilkinson, Hayden affil: https://ror.org/052gg0110 University of Oxford, Oxford, England su: Special relativity (Physics) General relativity (Physics) Physics Universe sug: subj: Special relativity (Physics) General relativity (Physics) Physics Universe keyword: Aggregation General relativity Infinite utility streams Infinite value Special relativity Utilitarianism ab: Aggregative moral theories face a series of devastating problems when we apply them in a physically realistic setting. According to current physics, our universe is likely infinitely large, and will contain infinitely many morally valuable events. But standard aggregative theories are ill-equipped to compare outcomes containing infinite total value. So, applied in a realistic setting, they cannot compare any outcomes a real-world agent must ever choose between. This problem has been discussed extensively, and non-standard aggregative theories proposed to overcome it. This paper addresses a further problem of similar severity. Physics tells us that, in our universe, how remotely in time an event occurs is relative. But our most promising aggregative theories, designed to compare outcomes containing infinitely many valuable events, are sensitive to how remote in time those events are. As I show, the evaluations of those theories are then relative too. But this is absurd; evaluations of outcomes must be absolute! So we must reject such theories. Is this objection fatal for all aggregative theories, at least in a relativistic universe like ours? I demonstrate here that, by further modifying these theories to fit with the physics, we can overcome it. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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