The Principle of Explosion in the Stoic Logic.

I argue that the Stoic logic is explosive. The claim applies to the Stoics' syllogistic in the strictest sense, because there is a provable syllogism which qualifies as a principle of explosion. It applies also to the general consequence operation, in the sense that every sentence is derivable from...

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Publicado en:Logic & Logical Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 2; pp. 325 - 346
Autor principal: Tkaczyk, Marcin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Logic & Logical Philosophy Jun2024
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        affil: Faculty of Philosophy, The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
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        Logic
        Explosions
        Syllogism
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          Logic
          Explosions
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      ab: I argue that the Stoic logic is explosive. The claim applies to the Stoics' syllogistic in the strictest sense, because there is a provable syllogism which qualifies as a principle of explosion. It applies also to the general consequence operation, in the sense that every sentence is derivable from any pair containing both a sentence and the negation of the sentence. Finally, it applies to the connective of implication (conditional), in the sense that any conditional is derivable, providing its antecedent is a conjunction of a sentence and the negation of the sentence. All three claims allow weakening, i.e., additions of extra premises to an inference or extra conjuncts to the antecedent of an implication, respectively. Consequently, no concept of relevance, let alone paraconsistency or connexivity is applicable to the Stoic logic; in particular, the Stoics' connective of implication is either material (Boolean) or formal (strict).
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