Two Approaches to Reduction: A Case Study from Statistical Mechanics.
I argue that there are two distinct approaches to understanding reduction: the ontology-first approach and the theory-first approach. They concern the relation between ontological reduction and inter-theoretic reduction. Further, I argue for the significance of this distinction by demonstrating that...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 91; no. 4; pp. 969 - 990 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179870508&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179870508 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 91 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 179870508 10.1017/psa.2023.52 ppf: 969 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 263KB tig: atl: Two Approaches to Reduction: A Case Study from Statistical Mechanics. aug: au: Guo, Bixin affil: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA su: Statistical mechanics sug: subj: Statistical mechanics ab: I argue that there are two distinct approaches to understanding reduction: the ontology-first approach and the theory-first approach. They concern the relation between ontological reduction and inter-theoretic reduction. Further, I argue for the significance of this distinction by demonstrating that either one or the other approach has been taken as an implicit assumption in, and has in fact shaped, our understanding of what statistical mechanics is. More specifically, I argue that Boltzmannian statistical mechanics assumes and relies on the ontology-first approach, whereas Gibbsian statistical mechanics should assume the theory-first approach. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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