Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time.
We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 109; no. 2; pp. 528 - 548 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179963417&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179963417 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2024 vid: 109 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 179963417 10.1111/phpr.13054 ppf: 528 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 434KB tig: atl: Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time. aug: au: Bigg, Anthony Latham, Andrew J. Miller, Kristie Yechimovitz, Shira affil: The University of Sydney, Sydney New South Wales,, Australia Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark The University of Sydney and Centre for Time, Sydney New South Wales,, Australia The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel su: Imagination Experience Philosophy of time Hypothesis Time sug: subj: Imagination Experience Philosophy of time Hypothesis Time ab: We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems to them as though time robustly passes and to judge that time does robustly pass. According to the former, a greater degree of vividness will tend to increase the extent to which people make such reports, while according to the latter, it will tend to decrease the extent to which people make such reports. We found weak evidence in favour of the former hypothesis. We reflect on the implications of this finding for theorising about such reports. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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