Self‐love, growth, and competition in a public good game.
Competition and cooperation are not always at odds and contributions to public goods are almost never one‐off one‐shot temporally isolated events. We examine voluntary contribution in a new public good experiment where "self‐love" competitive motivations and time dynamic interdependencies are simult...
| Published in: | Kyklos Vol. 77; no. 4; pp. 845 - 873 |
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=180048334&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 180048334 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00235962 KYK jtl: Kyklos issn: 00235962 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2024 vid: 77 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 180048334 10.1111/kykl.12394 ppf: 845 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: Self‐love, growth, and competition in a public good game. aug: au: Colasante, Annarita Morone, Andrea Nemore, Francesco Tiranzoni, Paola affil: Università degli Studi di Roma Unitelma Sapienza, Rome, Italy Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Diritto dell'Impresa, Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", Bari, Italy Focus Economics, Barcelona, Spain su: Public goods Common good Motivation (Psychology) Gini coefficient Endowments sug: subj: Public goods Common good Motivation (Psychology) Grantmaking Foundations Gini coefficient Endowments ab: Competition and cooperation are not always at odds and contributions to public goods are almost never one‐off one‐shot temporally isolated events. We examine voluntary contribution in a new public good experiment where "self‐love" competitive motivations and time dynamic interdependencies are simultaneously considered. The competitive motivations are manipulated via subjects competing in each group (intragroup competition) for higher return factors on their public expenditure, whereas time dynamic interdependencies are modeled by letting returns from previous periods available for future contributions to public goods (CG). We ran two control conditions where intragroup competition (C) and time dynamic interdependencies (G) are separately implemented. Our findings showed that shares of endowment contributed were significantly greater and increasing over time when endowments growth and heterogeneous returns factors were simultaneously introduced. This effect can be attributed to return factors obtained in previous periods. Accordingly, wealth exponential growth has been greatly accelerated relative to our control condition. Distributive equity concerns have been also documented. Although Gini coefficients were significantly lower in the presence of heterogeneous return factors and endowments growth, inequality trends seemed to converge at control condition values in the long term. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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