The role of causal manipulability in the manifestation of time biases.
We investigate the causal manipulability hypothesis, according to which what partly explains (a) why people tend to prefer negative events to be in their further future rather than their nearer future and positive events to be in their nearer future rather than their further future and (b) why peopl...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 204; no. 4; pp. 1 - 35 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180050370&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180050370 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 204 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 180050370 10.1007/s11229-024-04740-7 ppf: 1 ppct: 34 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 4.1MB tig: atl: The role of causal manipulability in the manifestation of time biases. aug: au: Hodroj, Batoul Latham, Andrew J. Miller, Kristie Pedersen, Rasmus Wang, Danqi affil: https://ror.org/0384j8v12 Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Camperdown, Australia https://ror.org/01aj84f44 Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark https://ror.org/024mrxd33 Department of Philosophy, Leeds University, Leeds, UK sug: keyword: Causal manipulation Experimental philosophy Future bias Near bias Preferences Time bias ab: We investigate the causal manipulability hypothesis, according to which what partly explains (a) why people tend to prefer negative events to be in their further future rather than their nearer future and positive events to be in their nearer future rather than their further future and (b) why people tend to prefer that negative events be located in their past not their future and that positive events be located in their future not their past, is that people tend to discount the value of events they are less able causally to manipulate. If people discount the value of events they are less able to causally manipulate, then since often temporally nearer future events are more causally manipulable than further ones, and since future events are manipulable whereas past ones aren’t, this could explain both (a) and (b). In turn, if the causal manipulability hypothesis is correct, this might suggest that insofar as people’s preferences are explained in this manner, those preferences are rationally permissible, since relative causal manipulability is normatively relevant. Thus, ascertaining whether the causal manipulability hypothesis is true may shed light on the normative status of such preferences. We investigate the cognitively mediated version of the causal manipulability hypothesis, according to which people’s consciously held beliefs about the relative causal manipulability of events explains (a) and (b). Contrary to expectations, we found no evidence in favour of this view. We suggest that either relative causal manipulability plays an explanatory role, but one that is not cognitively mediated, or that it does not play any role, even if it is sometimes associated with other factors, such as probability, that may play a role in explaining some time biased preferences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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