Distinguishing two kinds of fictionalism: metaphor, autism, and the imagination.
Fictionalist theories of metaphor hold that metaphorical utterances aim at fictionality. Fictionalism successfully explains speaker judgments about the truth and aptness of metaphorical utterances, and it also accurately predicts the data around metaphor and autistic individuals (who have deficits i...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 204; no. 4; pp. 1 - 24 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180050372&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180050372 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 204 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 180050372 10.1007/s11229-024-04742-5 ppf: 1 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 599KB tig: atl: Distinguishing two kinds of fictionalism: metaphor, autism, and the imagination. aug: au: Lane, Elek affil: 301 Philosophy Hall, 94720, Berkeley, CA, USA sug: keyword: Autism Contextualism Fictionalism Imagination Metaphor ab: Fictionalist theories of metaphor hold that metaphorical utterances aim at fictionality. Fictionalism successfully explains speaker judgments about the truth and aptness of metaphorical utterances, and it also accurately predicts the data around metaphor and autistic individuals (who have deficits in both imaginative play and metaphor comprehension). But fictionalism is not a viable theory of metaphor, despite these merits, because of (what I call) the problem of semantic entailment: semantic entailments that are normally valid fail under metaphorical interpretation, but fictionalism predicts otherwise. I argue this to ultimately show that theorists of metaphor should reject the linguistic side of the fictionalist story; but this leaves open the possibility of accepting psychological fictionalism, i.e., the hypothesis that fiction/make-believe is central to the cognitive processing of metaphor. Coupling psychological fictionalism with a different theory of metaphorical meaning and content (such as contextualism) promises to keep the explanatory upsides of traditional fictionalism while avoiding the problem of semantic entailment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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