Peirce on the Normative Basis of Deductive Logic.
I analyze Peirce's reply in the 1903 Lowell Lectures to the "defendant argument" and show how his response provides a key to interpreting his later philosophy of logic and his views on the normative role of deductive logic in inquiry. I argue that in Peirce's discussion of self-control in reasoning...
| Publicado en: | Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 60; no. 2; pp. 129 - 160 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Editorial |
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Indiana University Press
Spring2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180148077&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180148077 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00091774 2HR jtl: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society issn: 00091774 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Spring2024 vid: 60 iid: 2 pid: 211 pub: Indiana University Press artinfo: ui: 180148077 10.2979/csp.00024 ppf: 129 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 592KB tig: atl: Peirce on the Normative Basis of Deductive Logic. aug: au: Finley, Robby affil: University of Maine su: Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Logic Normativity (Ethics) Theory of knowledge Criticism Argument Self-control sug: subj: Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Logic Normativity (Ethics) Theory of knowledge Criticism Argument Self-control keyword: Charles S. Peirce Epistemology of Logic Logical Revision Normativity of Logic Philosophy of Logic Reasoning ab: I analyze Peirce's reply in the 1903 Lowell Lectures to the "defendant argument" and show how his response provides a key to interpreting his later philosophy of logic and his views on the normative role of deductive logic in inquiry. I argue that in Peirce's discussion of self-control in reasoning and evaluation of reasoning, we find an underappreciated position on logical revision and how to understand rational choice between deductive theories. To defend this point, I reconstruct Peirce's reply by providing an interpretation of his comments on higher-order criticism and the soundness of our reasoning, arguing that the resulting position's ability to separate questions involving the role of logic in inquiry from questions better suited to the mathematical study of a logical theory provides a fruitful pragmatist reframing of problems in the epistemology of logic. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Editorial src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society is the property of Indiana University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society holder: Indiana University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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